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Abstract
A growing literature has tried to measure the extent to which individuals
have equal opportunities to acquire income. At the same time, policymakers
have doubled down on efforts to go beyond income when designing policies
to enhance well-being. We attempt to bridge these two areas by measuring
the extent to which individuals have equal opportunities to achieve a high
level of well-being. We use the German Socio-Economic Panel to measure
well-being in four different ways including incomes. This makes it possible
to determine if the way well-being is measured matters for identifying who
the opportunity-deprived are and for tracking inequality of opportunity over
time. We find that, regardless of how well-being is measured, the same people
are opportunity-deprived and equality of opportunity has improved over the
past 10 years. This suggests that going beyond income has little relevance if
the objective is to provide equal opportunities.
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1 Introduction
The notion that individuals ought to have equal opportunities in life is popular
among politicians, the general public, and philosophers alike. A sizable number of
empirical studies have analyzed the extent to which individuals have equal oppor-
tunities for income acquisition (see Ramos and Van de gaer (2016), Roemer and
Trannoy (2015), and Ferreira and Peragine (2016) for recent reviews). These stud-
ies are based on the idea that when evaluating the progress of societies, looking at
the level and distribution of incomes provides an incomplete picture. A distinction
has to be made between income differences arising from factors individuals ought to
be held personally responsible for and income differences arising from factors out-
side the realm of personal responsibility. Whereas the former income differences are
considered fair, the latter are considered unfair, and ought to be minimized.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in going beyond income to
measure individual well-being (Fitoussi et al., 2010). Well-being (or welfare, we use
the two interchangeably) is inherently multidimensional, and growth and income
statistics fail to capture this multiplicity. Given the growing interest in going beyond
income, it seems pertinent to apply this discussion to the equality of opportunity
framework. If individuals ought to have equal opportunities for well-being, then
using income as the acquisition variable in equality of opportunity studies could
be problematic. Incomes ignore the disutility of effort, the well-being individuals
receive from other dimensions of life, and the differences in preferences over income
and these other dimensions. Indeed, the philosophers who advocate for equality of
opportunity do not advocate for equality of opportunity for income acquisition, but
rather something broader than income such as welfare or advantage (Arneson, 1989;
Cohen, 1990).
Once it is acknowledged that incomes are not sufficient for measuring well-being,
the door opens for many alternatives. Which other well-being dimensions are neces-
sary? Should we measure these dimensions separately or somehow aggregate them
into a single number? How can we incorporate the fact that individuals have differ-
ent preferences over these various dimensions? Should we try to measure well-being
directly by alluding to self-reported happiness levels?
We use 25 years of data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP) to
measure welfare in four ways; with incomes, life satisfaction, a multidimensional
index, and equivalent incomes. We use incomes to facilitate comparisons with the
generic way of measuring equality of opportunity. The other three measures have
roots in different philosophical theories about well-being (Parfit, 1984; Griffin, 1986).
Life satisfaction explicitly tries to measure mental states, the multidimensional index
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defines and aggregates an objective list of dimensions of importance for well-being,
and equivalent incomes incorporate preference heterogeneity.
We will investigate if the measure of welfare matters for 1) characterizing the
opportunity-deprived and 2) tracking inequality of opportunity over time. In both
cases, we first regress the welfare measures on circumstance and effort variables
or equivalently, variables we hold individuals responsible for and variables we do
not hold individuals responsible for. In order to answer our first research question,
whether the measure of welfare matters for characterizing the opportunity-deprived,
we assign each individual an “opportunity” rank. The opportunity ranks order
individuals according to how much their circumstances contribute to their welfare.
They can be interpreted as an ordinal measure of individuals’ opportunities, where
the highest ranked possesses the best combination of circumstances and vice versa.
We compare the determinants of the opportunity ranks across the four well-being
measures. Broadly speaking, if individuals have similar opportunity ranks across
the four well-being measures, then a characterization of the opportunity-deprived
will not depend on how we measure welfare.
In order to answer our second research question, whether the measure of welfare
matters for tracking inequality of opportunity over time, we use the norm-based ap-
proach. Upon regressing the welfare measures on circumstance and effort variables,
this entails assigning a fair welfare level to each individual, which only depends on
the individual’s effort variables. Next, norm-based inequality metrics that calculate
the divergence between the actual welfare levels and these fair welfare levels are
computed. The more the two vectors diverge, the more circumstances rather than
effort are determining welfare levels, and the more inequality of opportunity there
is. See Ramos and Van de gaer (2016) for more information on the norm-based
approach.
Since the four welfare measures follow different distributions, we are not able to
compare the extent of inequality of opportunity across the different measures. This
is little different from the fact that it is not possible to compare the level of welfare
or inequality of welfare across the different measures. We will deal with this problem
by indexing the extent of equality opportunity and tracking the development over
time. The development over time is comparable across the different measures.
We find that the measure of well-being matters little, both with regards to char-
acterizing the opportunity-deprived and with regards to tracking inequality of oppor-
tunity over time. In particular, we find that regardless of how welfare is measured,
inequality of opportunity in Germany has decreased in the last 10 years. These
results are robust to using different divergence measures and, for the most part, to
3
changing what we hold individuals responsible for. This is encouraging news for pol-
icymakers interested in providing equal opportunities while going beyond income,
as they may broadly get things right if they proxy well-being with income.
To our knowledge, this is the first paper to explicitly address the Beyond GDP
agenda in a Roemerian equality of opportunity framework. We are certainly not the
first, however, to relate notions of fairness with welfare measurement. Fleurbaey and
Maniquet (2011) summarize extensive work on this topic. This prior work generally
incorporates concerns about fairness directly into the well-being measure. Our ap-
proach, in contrast, first computes measures of welfare and then analyzes the extent
to which factors beyond individual control are driving the welfare differences. A
particularly relevant paper for our approach is Ravallion (2017), which incorporates
the disutility of effort into estimates of inequality of opportunity. We go in a differ-
ent direction by analyzing whether the concept of welfare matters for estimates of
inequality of opportunity. In previous studies, the measurement of welfare has been
shown to matter for assessments of how average welfare has developed over time
(Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004), for how inequality in welfare has developed over
time (Stevenson and Wolfers, 2008), and for identifying the most welfare-deprived
(Decancq and Neumann, 2016).
Roemer (2012) explicitly argues against using welfare as the outcome variable
in equality of opportunity estimations. He does on two grounds. Firstly, because
policymakers are interested in dimensions of well-being separately, such as health,
income, or education, rather than well-being itself. This may certainly be the case,
but if the ultimate objective is to equalize opportunities for well-being, then equal-
izing opportunities for only one dimension of well-being might actually bring about
the opposite result (Calsamiglia, 2009). To see this, consider a policy that targets
people born in a certain region of a country because they have fewer opportuni-
ties to acquire a high income. If these people simultaneously have better health,
more leisure, or different preferences over the importance of income, they need not
have fewer opportunities to acquire a high level of well-being. Our framework helps
clarify if such examples have empirical leverage. The second reason why Roemer
argues against using welfare as the outcome variable is grounded in the difficulty
of measuring well-being in a cardinal way. Although this certainly complicates the
exercise, we believe useful lessons can still be drawn.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explains both the philo-
sophical and axiomatic theory behind measuring equality of opportunity for well-
being. Section 3 details our data and measurement approach. Section 4 outlines the
results and provides several robustness checks. Section 5 concludes.
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2 Theory
2.1 Well-Being
Three overarching theories of well-being exist in the philosophical literature; ob-
jective list theory, preference satisfaction theory, and mental state theory (Parfit,
1984; Griffin, 1986). Preference satisfaction theory is the most commonly assumed
in economics. It claims that an individual’s welfare depends on the degree to which
his preferences are satisfied. Often preference orderings are assumed to be revealed
through choice behavior. The underlying tenet behind these revealed preferences
is that if an agent chooses bundle A over bundle B, then the agent must prefer A
over B, and the agent must be better off with A rather than B. Mental state theory
takes its starting point in what goes on inside the mind of individuals rather than
their observed choices. According to this theory, well-being is the degree to which
individuals are happy or the extent to which they experience pleasure over pain.
Objective list theory argues that individuals’ lives go well to the degree that they
are in possession of certain items on a list, which could be income, education, health,
safety, etc.
In short, mental state theory cares about what individuals feel, (revealed) prefer-
ences about what individuals choose, and objective list theory about external factors,
which could be independent of the choices and feelings of individuals. Each theory
has its advantages and shortcomings. Preference satisfaction theory, at least in the
revealed form, can be criticized when individuals’ decision-making is subject to im-
perfect knowledge or behavioral biases. If individuals have mistaken beliefs about
what is best for themselves or lack willpower to choose what is best for themselves,
then there is little reason to believe that their choices are a good manifestation of
their well-being. Mental state theory can be criticized for its “physical condition
neglect” (Sen, 1985), whereby individuals might feel well only because they have
adapted to horrible conditions. Objective list theory can be criticized for being
elitist in the sense that a set of indicators and weights are chosen somewhat inde-
pendent of the preferences of individuals. All of these critiques can of course be
counteracted, but doing so would be outside the scope of this paper.
This three-part division of well-being concepts is still very much in use today
in both theoretical and empirical literature about well-being (see for example the
chapter division in the Oxford Handbook of Well-Being and Public Policy (Adler and
Fleurbaey, 2016) and the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on Well-Being (Crisp,
2016)). We will operationalize a measure of well-being with roots in each of these
theories and see if they lead to different conclusions about equality of opportunity.
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We are not attempting to argue in favor of one of these welfare concepts. Rather,
we will take some of the operationalizations of these concepts at face value and
investigate if equality of opportunity estimations depend on which measure is used.
2.2 Distributive Justice
Until Rawls published his Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971), the predominant view of
justice was defined in utilitarian terms. Under this view, the just outcome maximizes
total welfare or, equivalently, equalizes marginal utilities. This view is welfarist
in the sense that if all individuals’ welfare levels are known, then no additional
information is needed to decide whether one scenario is more desirable than another.
Rawls argued against this welfarist view, emphasizing that we should not seek to
equalize marginal utilities, but rather primary goods, which is a broader notion that
also encompasses rights and liberties.
A number of subsequent scholars proposed variations of what the right equal-
izandum ought to be, building on the work of Rawls. Sen (1980) argued that neither
utilities nor primary goods were enough to judge outcomes. He concluded that we
need to look at what individuals are capable of achieving with these goods, thus
advocating for basic capability equality. Dworkin (1981) contended that resources
are the right equalizandum, while Arneson (1989) and Cohen (1990) argued that we
ought to pursue equality of opportunity for welfare and equal access to advantage
(see Roemer and Trannoy (2016) for a more complete account on the developments
in distributive justice since Rawls).
Although these philosophers differ in their preferred equalizandum, they all ad-
here to the point of view that knowing all individuals’ welfare levels is not sufficient.
We need to know how that welfare came about, whether it came from fortunate
backgrounds or from factors we can hold individuals accountable for. As such, they
agree on the need to go beyond welfarism and accept some degree of individual
responsibility, and thereby some degree of just inequalities. Notably, none of the
philosophers defined the equalizandum in terms of income. Rather, they considered
broader notions than income such as welfare, advantage, or functionings. Our ap-
proach attempts to get a bit closer to these frameworks. In particular, our approach
is closely related to that of Arneson (1989), who precisely argued for equalization of
opportunities for welfare.1
1That being said, Arneson (1989) considered welfare to be preference satisfaction, thus differing
from our take, where we will look at different theories of welfare.
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2.3 Equality of Opportunity with the Norm-Based Approach
The philosophical theories of distributive justice have been operationalized in eco-
nomics through the works of Roemer (1993), Van de gaer (1993), and Fleurbaey
(1994) amongst others. The starting point in many of these operationalizations is
to consider a population, N = {1, 2, . . . , n}, and a distribution of an outcome vari-
able for this population, y = (y1, y2, . . . , yn). Often y is considered to be income,
but here we will take welfare/well-being as the outcome, such that yi is the welfare
of individual i ∈ N . An individual’s outcome is assumed to be a product of two
sets of variables: circumstances, aC , and effort, aE. Circumstances are the factors
outside the realm of control for the individual, the factors one ought not to hold
an individual responsible for. These are often taken to be gender, region of birth,
parental education, parental income etc. Effort variables are the factors one ought
to hold an individual responsible for. The well-being of individual i is thus assumed
to be given by yi = f(a
C
i ,a
E
i ). We consider the well-being levels to be cardinal
and interpersonally comparable, but our setting also works in an ordinal framework
where we convert the welfare levels into welfare ranks.
Based on this set-up, the literature proceeds with measuring the extent to which
the outcome variable is driven by circumstance or effort variables. To do so we will
rely on the norm-based approach (Ramos and Van de gaer, 2016), also called the
fairness gap in Fleurbaey and Schokkaert (2009). This approach uses fair allocation
rules to assign each individual a fair outcome, which only depends on his or her effort
level, and calculates inequality of opportunity as the divergence between the actual
outcomes and the fair outcomes. The more the two distributions diverge, the less
individuals’ effort are associated with their well-being and the more circumstances
are shaping individuals’ outcomes.
The axiomatic literature on fair allocations has put forward two criteria that
fair allocation rules ideally ought to satisfy, these being the compensation principle
and the reward principle. The compensation principle states that differences in
well-being due to differences in circumstances should be eliminated. The reward
principle is concerned with the proper reward of effort for individuals with the same
circumstances. Unfortunately, these two criteria are mutually incompatible (Bossert,
1995; Fleurbaey, 1995). The literature has proposed allocation rules that weaken
these two principles in order to make them compatible. Two such rules are the
Egalitarian Equivalent principle (Bossert and Fleurbaey, 1996) and the Generalized
Proportionality principle (Cappelen and Tungodden, 2017).
Both principles start by defining a norm vector of circumstance variables, a˜C
and calculate the well-being individuals would have had, if they had this norm level
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of circumstances, f(aEi , a˜
C). This neutralizes the effect of circumstances on well-
being and the differences in f(aEi , a˜
C) can therefore be thought of as expressing
fair advantage. As the mean of f(aEi , a˜
C) may differ from the mean of the actual
outcomes, and since resources should not be wasted and cannot come out of nothing,
some adjustment is necessary. The two fair allocation rules deal with this in different
ways. To estimate the distribution of fair outcomes, call this z, the Egalitarian
Equivalent (EE) principle, distributes the difference between the size of the two
distributions equally across individuals:
zEEi = f(a
E
i , a˜
C) +
(
µ(y)−
∑
j∈N f(a
E
j , a˜
C)
n
)
, (1)
where µ(y) = 1
n
∑
j∈N yj. This principle has the advantage that if the well-being
function is linearly separable in circumstances and effort, such that yi = g(a
E
i ) +
h(aCi ), then the fair well-being levels do not depend on which norm vector of cir-
cumstances is chosen and the expression boils down to
zEEi = g(a
E
i ) +
∑
j∈N h(a
C
j )
n
. (2)
The Generalized Proportionality (GP) principle, instead, respects the well-being
shares of the fair well-being allocation f(aEi , a˜
C) by scaling them by the same factor:
zGPi = f(a
E
i , a˜
C)
µ(y)∑
j∈N f(a
E
j , a˜
C)/n
. (3)
An individual’s fair outcome only depends on his/her effort variables and reflects
how much the individual ideally is entitled to under the given allocation principles.2
The more aligned the fair outcomes and the actual outcomes are, the lower in-
equality of opportunity. Conversely, the more they diverge, the greater inequality
of opportunity. We can measure the extent to which the two distributions diverge
from each other by employing a divergence measure, D(y‖z), which evaluates the
divergence between the two distributions, y and z.
Magdalou and Nock (2011) (MN) provide a framework for axiomatically grounded
divergence measures.3 They put forth a class of divergence measures between an
2Here we neglect the minor impact each individual’s circumstances have on the mean welfare
level.
3We are heavily indebted for comments and advice from Brice Magdalou on the use and inter-
pretation of appropriate divergence measures.
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outcome distribution, y, and a reference distribution, z:
DMN(y‖z) = 1
n
∑
i∈N
[φ(yi)− φ(zi)− (yi − zi)φ′(zi)] , (4)
where for all c ∈ R++, the function φ(c) is given by:
φ(c) :=

1
s(s−1) c
s , if s 6= 0, 1 ,
c ln c , if s = 1 ,
− ln c , if s = 0 .
(5)
s is a sensitivity parameter, similar to the one we find in standard inequality mea-
surement. This class boils down to the generalized entropy class of standard in-
equality measures if z is assumed to be the mean of the actual distribution. The
class DMN(y‖z) satisfies partial symmetry (i.e. it is invariant to permutations of
(yi, zi) pairs) along with other relevant properties. By using the function φ from (5)
in (4), one obtains
DMN(y‖z) =

1
n
1
s(s−1)
∑
i∈N
[
ysi + (s− 1)zsi − s yi zs−1i
]
, if s 6= 0, 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N [yi ln (yi/zi) + zi − yi] , if s = 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N [yi/zi − ln (yi/zi)− 1] , if s = 0 .
(6)
Cowell (1985) suggests a different class of divergence measures, which he calls
measures of distributional change, that satisfies different properties.4 The measure
equivalent to (4) is:
DC(y‖z) = 1
n
∑
i∈N
[zi φ(yi/zi)] . (7)
4The measures proposed by Magdalou and Nock (2011) and Cowell (1985) differ in two im-
portant aspects. Both divergence measures generalize the principle of transfers, a cornerstone to
inequality measurement, but Magdalou and Nock (2011) impose a weaker generalization of the
principle of transfers than Cowell (1985). In addition, and unlike Cowell (1985), Magdalou and
Nock (2011) impose judgement separability, which allows measures to be additively decomposed
into two components when the reference distribution is egalitarian, but the mean of the reference
distribution differs from the mean of the actual distribution. The first component evaluates the di-
vergence between the actual distribution and a hypothetical distribution where everyone has mean
income, while the second one evaluates the efficiency loss brought about by the divergence be-
tween the hypothetical distribution where everyone has mean income and the egalitarian reference
distribution.
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By using the function φ from (5) in (7), DC(y‖z) can be written as
DC(y‖z) =

1
n
1
s(s−1)
∑
i∈N (y
s
i z
1−s
i − 1), if s 6= 0, 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N yi ln(yi/zi) , if s = 1 ,
1
n
∑
i∈N zi ln(zi/yi) , if s = 0 ,
(8)
where “−1” is added when s 6= 0, 1 to obtain a proper generalization of the gener-
alized class of inequality indices. Devooght (2008) provides an empirical application
of this class to equality of opportunity in Belgium.
The two different classes of divergence measures, DMN(y‖z) and DC(y‖z), co-
incide when s = 1 (the last two terms in DMN(y‖z) when s = 1 cancel each other
out in our case). For this reason we are going to use s = 1 as our main specification.
Parameters s = 0 and s = 2 with DMN(y‖z) will be used as robustness checks. One
of the features of DMN is that a progressive transfer in the actual distribution, y,
reduces the divergence between y and z as long as the individuals involved in the
transfer have the same reference, z. It is a kind of priority given to the worse-off in-
dividuals when the individuals involved in the transfer share the same z. Moreover,
if (and only if) s < 2, the further down the distribution of y such a transfer takes
place, the more the divergence between z and y is reduced. This property resem-
bles the principle of diminishing transfers in the context of inequality measurement,
which holds for the class of entropy indices when s < 2. When s = 2 the measure
is ordinally equivalent to the Euclidian distance, and it is thus insensitive to the
position on the distribution where the progressive transfer (among individuals with
the same reference) takes place. Thus, the parameter value s = 2 can be seen as
a threshold. Contrary to this, the parameter value s = 0 yields a measure that is
more sensitive to transfers lower down the distribution than our baseline measure
with s = 1.
As another robustness check we will use a divergence measure which is a gener-
alization of the standard Gini coefficient developed by Alma˚s et al. (2011), called
the Unfairness Gini, DGini(y‖z):
DGini(y‖z) = 1
2n(n− 1)µ(y)
∑
i∈N
∑
j∈N
|(yi − zi)− (yj − zj)| . (9)
As a final robustness check we will use a very simple measure of measure of
the divergence; the rank correlation between welfare levels and h(aC). A large
correlation suggests a high degree of inequality of opportunity, since individuals
with the best circumstances also have the highest welfare levels. A correlation of 0,
in turn, reflects that the quality of individuals’ circumstances is not correlated with
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their welfare. If we use income as the outcome variable and consider parental income
as the only circumstance variable, then this measure boils down to a frequently
used measure of immobility; Spearman’s correlation between parents’ and children’s
income level (see for example Chetty et al. (2014)).
3 Data & Measurement
We use data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), which is a yearly
panel that started in 1984. The panel contains detailed questions on household
income, life satisfaction, other well-being dimensions, as well as biographical and
historical data that we use to construct circumstance variables. We use data from
1992, the first year where East Germany can be included in our sample, to 2016,
and include all working and unemployed individuals but drop individuals outside the
labor market and observations with missing values. In total, we have 170,142 person-
year observations meeting our baseline specification. These are spread around 21,838
individuals in 15,452 different households.
Our baseline analysis will use the following circumstance variables: gender, fa-
ther’s education (3 categories), mother’s education (3 categories), father’s occupa-
tion (6 categories), polynomial of age, height, place of birth (West Germany, East
Germany, abroad), degree of urbanization at place of birth (4 categories), and num-
ber of siblings. As baseline effort variables we use years of education, work hours,
a dummy for whether the respondent is self-employed, and a dummy for whether
the respondent works in the public sector. Effort may be a slightly misleading term
here, the point of these four variables is that they plausibly lie within individual
control and hence constitute factors that we may hold individuals accountable for.
One could easily argue that, say, number of hours worked does not lie within indi-
vidual control. For this reason, we will provide robustness checks where we move
these four variables to the other side of the responsibility cut. Summary statistics
of the circumstance and effort variables are given in Table 1.
3.1 Constructing Welfare Variables
We use four different welfare variables in the analysis. First, we use log incomes.
This is the most frequently used outcome variable in equality of opportunity studies.
We use it as a baseline for comparison to the other well-being measures. We use
annual net household income expressed in 2010 constant EUR adjusted for family
size using the OECD equivalence scales. The other three welfare variables are rooted
in the three concepts of well-being that Parfit (1984) and Griffin (1986) put forward.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
mean sd min max
Circumstance Variables
Father’s education: Lower secondary or less 0.65 0.48 0 1
Father’s education: Upper secondary 0.21 0.41 0 1
Father’s education: Tertiary 0.14 0.34 0 1
Mother’s education: Lower secondary or less 0.68 0.47 0 1
Mother’s education: Upper secondary 0.25 0.43 0 1
Mother’s education: Tertiary 0.08 0.26 0 1
Father’s occupation: Blue-collar (untrained) 0.13 0.34 0 1
Father’s occupation: Blue-collar (trained) 0.33 0.47 0 1
Father’s occupation: Not employed 0.07 0.26 0 1
Father’s occupation: White-collar 0.27 0.44 0 1
Father’s occupation: Self-employed 0.11 0.32 0 1
Father’s occupation: Civil servant 0.08 0.28 0 1
Place of upbringing: Large city 0.22 0.41 0 1
Place of upbringing: Medium city 0.18 0.39 0 1
Place of upbringing: Small city 0.23 0.42 0 1
Place of upbringing: Countryside 0.37 0.48 0 1
Place of birth: West Germany 0.64 0.48 0 1
Place of birth: East Germany 0.29 0.45 0 1
Place of birth: Abroad 0.07 0.26 0 1
Height 172.96 9.22 80 220
Female 0.47 0.50 0 1
Number of siblings 1.92 1.65 0 17
Age 42.39 12.25 17 91
Effort Variables
Years of education 12.64 2.73 7 18
Weekly work hours 35.54 15.96 0 80
Self-employed 0.09 0.29 0 1
Works in public sector 0.18 0.39 0 1
Notes: Summary statistics of circumstance and effort variables. n = 170,142.
The second welfare measure we use is life satisfaction, which has roots in men-
tal state theory. Life satisfaction is the answer to the question, “How satisfied are
you with your life, all things considered?” The answer categories range from 0
(completely dissatisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). For the purpose of this study,
we consider the answers interpersonally comparable. This is not meant as an en-
dorsement of this particular account of well-being but rather as an inquiry into how
inequality of opportunity estimates would look if one accepted these assumptions.
The third welfare measure we use is a multidimensional welfare measure, which
has roots in objective list theory. To construct the measure of multidimensional wel-
fare we partly follow Decancq and Neumann (2016). We consider four dimensions;
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income, health, leisure, and employment.5 Income is measured the same way as
above. Employment is a binary variable taking the value of 1 if the respondent had
a job at the time of the survey. Leisure is measured as the amount of daily hours
spent on leisure (capped at 6 hours). Health is itself a composite index composed
of 1) an indicator for whether the individual is disabled, 2) the number of doctor
appointments the respondent had last year and 3) the number of inpatient nights
in hospitals the respondent had last year. To aggregate these sub-dimensions into
one health dimension we regress a health satisfaction question on the three variables
and use the coefficients as weights. The health satisfaction variable is composed of
answers to how satisfied individuals are with their health on a scale from 0 (not
at all satisfied) to 10 (completely satisfied). For the income, leisure, and health
dimension, we standardize the values such that the highest observed level is 1 and
the lowest observed level is 0. Now we have four dimensions each bounded between
0 and 1. To arrive at the final multidimensional index, we simply add these four
together.
The fourth welfare measure, equivalent incomes, is based on preference satisfac-
tion theory. In short, equivalent incomes are the incomes individuals need together
with a reference bundle, to make them indifferent with their actual bundle. Al-
though preferences are often estimated from choice behavior, this is difficult when
the arguments cover a wide array of dimensions of well-being. An alternative method
to recover preferences used by Decancq et al. (2015), is to regress life satisfaction on
the dimensions of well-being and interpret the weights as marginal rates of substi-
tution. The resulting utility functions seem to be highly correlated with the utility
functions one would recover from choice behavior (Akay et al., 2017). This approach
easily accommodates preference heterogeneity by allowing for interactions between
sociodemographic characteristics, w, and the various dimensions, dim. We follow
this approach and use the following subset of the circumstance and effort variables
as preference heterogeneity parameters, w: birth location, sex, age, work hours,
self-employed, and public sector worker. As the non-income dimensions, dim, we
consider health, employment, and leisure, like in the multidimensional index. Our
life satisfaction regression looks as follows:
lifesatit = [β
inc + γincwit]ln(incit) + [β
dim + γdimwit]dimit +wit +µt +αi + εit (10)
5Although we would like to include more dimensions, such as education, we run into estimation
problems since this also is considered an effort variable. As we will regress the welfare variable on
circumstance and effort variables, and since we do not want to have the same variables on each
side of the regression, we omit this dimension.
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Output from this regression is shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix. In order to
calculate the equivalent incomes, we first select a reference vector, ˜dim, of all other
dimensions than income. Here we choose the mean outcome (mode for categorical
variables), since this avoids favoring any extreme marginal rates of substitution.6
Then we calculate the income needed together with ˜dim for this joint bundle to
make individuals indifferent with their actual bundle. That is, we isolate ln(inceqit )
below:
lifesat
(
ln(incit), dimit
)
= lifesat
(
ln(inceqit ),
˜dim
)
⇔ ln(inceqit ) = ln(incit) +
βdim + γdimwit
βinc + γincwit
(dimit − ˜dim)
(11)
The result is an interpersonally comparable measure of individual welfare that takes
differences in preferences into account.
By employing equivalent incomes as a welfare measure in our analysis, we are im-
plicitly taking sides in a rich philosophical debate about whether individuals should
be held responsible for their preferences. Our empirical approach implicitly deems
differences in well-being arising from preference heterogeneity unfair if they stem
from circumstance variables, but fair if they stem from effort variables. This is in
contrast to most applications of equivalent incomes, which hold that individuals
should be responsible for all their preferences. We can amend our approach such
that individuals are held responsible for all their preferences by decomposing the
equivalent income measure into a part that is due to preference heterogeneity and
a part that does not incorporate preference heterogeneity. We will do so as a ro-
bustness check. A detailed discussion of this method along with an illustration is
given in Appendix A.2. Still, our usage of equivalent incomes as a welfare measure
that is regressed on income and circumstance variables is in contrast to the typical
use of equivalent incomes, which incorporate issues of unfairness directly into the
measure. We simply interpret equivalent incomes as another measure of well-being
to be used in our analysis.7
Histograms of the four final welfare measures are presented in Figure 1.
6To see this, suppose we were to choose the maximum value rather than the mean. Then we
would give individuals with a high preference for income a relatively high level of well-being, as
these individuals need a relatively high income together with this reference bundle to be indifferent
to their actual bundle.
7A challenge with our use of equivalent incomes is the endogeneity problems generated by having
circumstance and effort variables influence the dependent variable as well as entering on the right-
hand side of the regressions. Measurement error in one of the variables we use as preference
shifters would create a spurious relationship between the fair outcomes and actual outcomes. For
the preference shifters we deal with, we conjecture this is a relatively minor concern.
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Figure 1: Histograms of Welfare Measures
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Notes: Histograms of the four welfare measures. The income and equivalent income distribution
is bottom (top) coded at the 0.1th (99.9th) percentile. Life satisfaction is bottom-coded at 1 since
values of 0 do not work with our divergence measure.
3.2 Estimating Equality of Opportunity
For our empirical specification, we consider well-being to be a linearly separable
function of effort and circumstance variables:
yit = β
CaCit + β
EaEit + it (12)
Two important issues remain unsettled. First is the issue of how to interpret the
error term, it. The error contains omitted effort variables, omitted circumstance
variables, measurement error, and general uncertainty. It is unclear whether this
should be considered within individual control. This is an important decision as it
accounts for most of the variation in the welfare levels. In our baseline specification,
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we follow the inequality of opportunity literature and consider it an effort variable,
but as a robustness check we shift it to the other side of the responsibility cut.
The other unsettled issue is what to do with the correlation between the effort
and circumstance variables. Individuals’ effort levels are partly determined by their
own choices and partly by their circumstances. Years of education, for example, is
partly influenced by individuals’ social background and partly by an individual’s own
choices. We follow Roemer’s approach and consider this correlation to be outside
the realm of individual responsibility (Roemer, 1998).8 In practice, this means that
prior to estimating the impact of circumstances and efforts on well-being we perform
an auxiliary regression of the following form:
aEit = γa
C
it + ηit (13)
We perform such a regression for each effort variable and use the residuals from
these regressions as our effort variables in our main regression, which then becomes:
yit = (β
C + γβE)aCit + β
Eηit + it (14)
Due to the Frisch-Waugh-Lowell theorem, the coefficients on the effort variables
will be the same in (12) and (14). The coefficients on the circumstance variables will
be different as they in (14) also incorporate the indirect effect of circumstances on
effort.9 We will later report specifications where we omit this auxiliary regression.
To compare who the opportunity-deprived are across the four well-being mea-
sures, we rank individuals according to their opportunity profile, that is, according
to the quality of their circumstances. We calculate each person’s yearly opportunity
rank as
ropportunityit = Ht
[
(βC + γβE)aCit
]
, (15)
where Ht is the yearly cumulative distribution of individuals’ unfair advantage. This
allows us to compare the opportunity-deprived across the four well-being measures.
To estimate equality of opportunity over time using the norm-based approach,
8Jusot et al. (2013) likewise call this Roemer’s view, while not correcting for this correlation is
termed Barry’s view (Barry, 2005). A final possibility, where the correlation between effort and
circumstances is considered effort, is called Swift’s view (Swift, 2005).
9This regression obviously suffers from omitted variable bias, which makes the interpretation of
the coefficients from the regression problematic. As long as the regression does not overfit the data,
an implication of the omitted variables is that the regression provides a lower-bound estimate of
the amount if inequality attributable to circumstances (Ferreira and Gignoux, 2011; Brunori et al.,
2018).
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we first compute each individual’s fair outcome, using equation (2):
zEEit = g(a
E
it) +
∑
j∈N h(a
C
jt)
nt
= βEηit + it +
∑
j∈N (β
C + γβE)aCjt
nt
(16)
That is, we compute each individual’s fair outcome as the contribution to well-being
from the individual’s effort and the average contribution coming from circumstances
for all individuals in the sample for the year in question. Second, we utilize our
battery of divergence measures to compute the divergence between the fair outcomes
and the actual outcomes.
4 Results
4.1 Who are the Opportunity-Deprived?
Table A.2 in Appendix A.3 shows the results of the regressions from equation (14).
Based on this output and equation (15), we calculate each person’s yearly opportu-
nity rank. Table 2 shows the correlations between these opportunity ranks for the
four welfare measures. The correlations reveal the extent to which the same people
are opportunity-deprived across the four measures. In the table – and throughout
the paper – we bootstrap confidence intervals in order to take all derived uncertainty
into account, including the uncertainty when constructing the welfare measures. We
bootstrap 500 resamples at individual-level clusters.
Table 2: Correlation Between Opportunity Ranks
Log Inc. Life Sat. Multidim. Index Log Eq. Inc.
Log Income - - - -
Life Satisfaction 0.53 - - -
(0.47, 0.57)
Multidim. Index 0.73 0.89 - -
(0.70, 0.76) (0.86, 0.92)
Log Eq. Inc. 0.89 0.59 0.74 -
(0.81, 0.93) (0.50, 0.66) (0.66, 0.79)
Notes: Correlations between ropportunity for the four welfare measures. Bootstrapped 95th
percentile confidence intervals in parenthesis.
The opportunity ranks display rather high correlations, suggesting that the same
people are opportunity-deprived regardless of how we measure welfare. The welfare
measures we have constructed are of course partly contained within each other; the
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income variable is included in both the multidimensional index and the equivalent
income measure, and the latter two use the same four dimensions but aggregate
them differently. We can analyze the extent to which this is driving the high rank
correlations by comparing them with the rank correlation between the welfare levels,
which are shown in Table 3. In all cases, the correlations are higher when we look
at ropportunity. This indicates that the high opportunity rank correlations are not
driven solely by the measures’ interrelatedness. This also suggests that the way
welfare is measured matters more if we target the welfare-deprived than if we target
the opportunity-deprived.
Table 3: Spearman Correlation Between Welfare Measures
Log Inc. Life Sat. Multidim. Index Log Eq. Inc.
Log Income - - - -
Life Satisfaction 0.20 - - -
(0.18, 0.22)
Multidim. Index 0.42 0.20 - -
(0.41, 0.43) (0.19, 0.22)
Log Eq. Inc. 0.68 0.27 0.63 -
(0.61, 0.73) (0.25, 0.28) (0.58, 0.68)
Notes: Spearman correlation between welfare levels. Bootstrapped 95th percentile confi-
dence intervals in parenthesis.
Since individuals’ opportunities are unobservable, policymakers may have to as-
sist the opportunity-deprived indirectly. One way of doing so is by targeting indi-
viduals with circumstance profiles that are highly correlated with having low op-
portunities. We can use the opportunity ranks to test if the characteristics of the
opportunity-deprived are similar across the four welfare measures. To do so, we
calculate the average opportunity rank for individuals with a given circumstance.
Results are shown in Figure 2. The lower the average opportunity rank, the less op-
portunities individuals with the given circumstance have, and the more this circum-
stance is a potential factor policymakers can use to target the opportunity-deprived.
If the average rank is less than 50, then the particular group has less than average
opportunities.
There are many similarities across the welfare measures. Individuals with low
educated parents and individuals whose father was a blue-collar worker or not em-
ployed have low opportunities. The same applies to individuals who grew up in
the countryside, individuals born in East Germany, short individuals, females, and
individuals with many siblings.
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Figure 2: Who are the Opportunity-deprived?
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Notes: The figure shows the average opportunity rank (ropportunityit = Ht
[
(βC+γβE)aCit
]
)
for individuals that share a given circumstance. If the points are to the left of the line at
50, then individuals with this circumstance are more than average opportunity-deprived
and vice versa. Bars indicate bootstrapped 95th percentile confidence bands.
Meaningful differences emerge only in two places, for people born abroad and
for different age groups. People born abroad are more opportunity-deprived in all
measures but life satisfaction. A possible explanation for this is that people born
abroad understand the life satisfaction scale more optimistically than Germans. Al-
ternatively, it may be because people born abroad tend to have other circumstances,
which are particularly good for life satisfaction. We can indirectly check which effect
is driving the result by excluding place of birth from the regression, calculating new
opportunity ranks, and re-computing the average opportunity rank of individuals
born abroad. With this approach, the direct channel from being born abroad on life
satisfaction is omitted. Now the average opportunity rank of people born abroad
falls below 50 (not shown in figure). This suggests that the previous higher rank was
solely driven by the direct positive effect of being born abroad on life satisfaction,
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and that individuals born abroad fare worse than people born in Germany with
respect to the remaining circumstances. Hence, it may be that the high opportunity
rank with respect to life satisfaction for people being born abroad is solely due to
scaling effects.
With respect to age, young people are opportunity-deprived in income but not in
the multidimensional index. This is hardly surprising as the multidimensional index
includes health, and young people on average are healthier. Since young people
have a lower preference for health (as shown in Table A.1 in the Appendix), young
people are not faring better with equivalent incomes, despite the fact that they
are more healthy. With respect to life satisfaction, middle-aged are opportunity
deprived while young and people above 55 are doing better. This mimics the well-
known u-curved relationship between subjective well-being and age (Blanchflower
and Oswald, 2008; Clark et al., 1996).
It is questionable whether resources should be allocated such that individuals
have equal opportunities in every part of their life. For this reason, we will later on
place age on the other side of the responsibility cut. This may seem counterintu-
itive but it amounts to saying that individuals should have equal opportunities on
expectation over their lifecycle rather than in every point of their life (see Alm˚as
et al. (2011) for a similar approach).
In sum, there is relatively large agreement about whom the opportunity-deprived
are across the four measures. Hence, if a policymaker strives to target individuals
with low opportunities, it matters relatively little how welfare is measured. Al-
though this suggests that equalizing opportunities does not depend on how welfare
is measured, it may very well be the case that the public policies needed to prevent
inequality of opportunity from arising in the first place depend on which measure
of welfare is used. To study this properly, a causal framework is needed, which goes
beyond the scope of this paper.
4.2 Equality of Opportunity over Time
Before analyzing how equality of opportunity has evolved over time, and whether
this depends on the well-being measure used, we start with analyzing how the level
of well-being has evolved over time and how inequality in well-being has developed
over time. Panel (a) of Figure 3 shows the level of well-being in Germany from 1992-
2016. In the figure, and in the time-series figures to follow, we use three-year moving
averages to smoothen out erratic trends. The level of well-being is normalized to
100 in 1992 to foster comparisons between the different measures.
The figure shows that from around 2005, well-being has increased with all four
20
Figure 3: Development in Level and Inequality of Well-Being, 1992-2016
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Notes: Development in the level of well-being and inequality in well-being from 1992-2016. All
measures are normalized to equal 100 in 1992 to foster comparisons. Inequality is measured using
the Theil index. Bars indicate bootstrapped 95th percentile confidence bands.
measures, but prior to that, life satisfaction and the multidimensional index followed
different patterns than the remaining two measures. Panel (b) of Figure 3 shows
the development in inequality in the four welfare measures using the Theil index.
Inequality in log incomes has increased substantially over most of the period, in-
equality in life satisfaction has decreased over the past 10 years, while inequality in
the other two measures has followed intermediate trends.
Thus, the measure of welfare matters both when we look at the development
of welfare and the inequality of welfare over the past 25 years in Germany. How
do things look for the development of inequality of opportunity over time? This is
displayed in Figure 4.
Figure 4: Inequality of Opportunity over Time
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1992-2016 using
the Magdalou-Nock divergence measure with s = 1 and the Egalitarian Equivalent allocation rule.
Bars indicate bootstrapped 95th percentile confidence bands.
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Although confidence bands are quite wide, the measures follow broadly the same
pattern. From 1992 to 2005, inequality of opportunity increased, and from then and
until 2016, it gradually fell. Some of the welfare measures, particularly equivalent
incomes, are noisier, which can be explained by the added uncertainty from the
fairly complicated process of constructing this welfare measure.
4.3 Altering the Responsibility Cut
The analysis above was based on important normative assumptions regarding what
individuals were held responsible for. We assumed that individuals were responsible
for four variables (4var); their education, work hours, and whether they are self-
employed or work in the public sector. We also assumed that individuals should not
be held responsible for the part of these variables that could be accounted for by
circumstance variables. That is, the correlation (cor) between circumstances and
effort was itself considered outside the control of individuals. We further assumed
that the part of individual well-being that was unaccounted for by circumstance
or effort variables (residual) was within individual control. Next, we implicitly
considered well-being differences across different age groups (age) as unfair. Finally,
for the equivalent income measure, we assumed that individuals were not responsible
for well-being differences due to preference heterogeneity arising from circumstances
(pref ).
Our baseline effort set contained 4var and residual. In this section, we try to
shift the responsibility cut by altering what goes into the effort set. First, we look
at whether the characteristics of the opportunity-deprived change as we change the
effort set. This is analyzed in Figures 5 and 6. Figure 5 uses our most narrow effort
set, only 4var, while Figure 6 uses the widest possible effort set, 4var, residual, cor,
age, pref.
The figures show the same overall pattern as our main results. For the most part,
the opportunity-deprived share the same characteristics across all four measures.
The only disputes are, once again, for individuals born abroad and for different age
groups. The responsibility cut does matter for quantifying the degree to which a
particular group is opportunity-deprived. For example, individuals born in East
Germany have an average opportunity rank of about 40 with the smallest effort set
and 15 with the largest effort set. In other words, East Germans are not doing
too poorly if we only hold individuals responsible for four variables (which almost
mimics just looking at outcomes), but the more we hold individuals responsible for,
the more disadvantaged they are. This suggests that East Germans have relatively
high effort levels.
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Figure 5: Changing the Responsibility Cut: Effort = {4var}
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Notes: The figure shows the average opportunity rank for people sharing
a particular circumstance using a narrow effort set. Bars indicate boot-
strapped 95th percentile confidence bands.
Next, we look at whether the developments over time depend on where we place
the responsibility cut. We try six different specifications, which gradually expand
the effort set. Results are displayed in Figure 7. Our primary interest is not whether
the trends change as we change the responsibility cut, but rather whether the four
well-being measures follow similar trends regardless of where we place the cut.
Our baseline results are displayed in panel (c). If we no longer hold individuals
responsible for the four variables we had deemed effort (panel (b)), then our main
results become more clear; inequality of opportunity increased until about 2005 and
then decreased for all four measures. If we only hold individuals responsible for the
four variables and shift the residual to the other side of the responsibility cut (panel
(a)) then the picture looks very different, particularly for log income. Since the
four effort variables only are able to explain very little of the variance, the measure
almost boils down to the development in inequality over time, which we already
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Figure 6: Changing the Responsibility Cut: Effort = {4var, residual, cor, age, pref}
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Notes: The figure shows the average opportunity rank for people sharing
a particular circumstance using a wide effort set. We no longer report dif-
ferences in the average opportunity rank by age groups, as age is not con-
sidered a circumstance in this specification. Bars indicate bootstrapped
95th percentile confidence bands.
established follows different trends. Other studies that have switched the residual
to the other side of the responsibility cut likewise found this to have a great impact
on the results (see for example Alma˚s et al. (2011) and Devooght (2008)).
If we also hold individuals responsible for the correlation between effort and
circumstances (panel (d)), then we still see an increase in inequality of opportunity in
all measures from 1992-2005, but from then on the multidimensional index diverges
from the rest. In the other cases where we add more to the responsibility cut (panel
(e) and (f)), the overall trend changes, but stays broadly similar across the four
well-being measures. In these cases, inequality of opportunity has remained rather
flat or decreased a little from 1992 to 2016.
In sum, we find that when characterizing the opportunity-deprived, neither the
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Figure 7: Altering the Responsibility Cut
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(b) Effort: Residual
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
In
eq
ua
lit
y 
of
 o
pp
. (
19
92
=1
00
)
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Log Income Life Satisfaction
Multidim. Index Log Equivalent Incomes
(c) Effort: 4var, residual
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(d) Effort: 4var, residual, cor
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
In
eq
ua
lit
y 
of
 o
pp
. (
19
92
=1
00
)
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Log Income Life Satisfaction
Multidim. Index Log Equivalent Incomes
(e) Effort: 4var, residual, cor, age
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(f) Effort: 4var, residual, cor, age, pref
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1992-2016 for
different responsibility cuts. 4var: The four variables work hours, education, self-employed, and
works in public sector are considered effort. Residual: The residuals from the regressions of
the well-being variables on circumstance and effort variables are considered effort. Age: Age is
considered effort (implying we are equalizing lifetime opportunities). Cor: The correlation between
effort and circumstance variables is not considered a circumstance. Pref: Individuals are fully held
responsible for their preferences (only applies to the equivalent income measure). Our baseline
specification used 4var and residual as effort.
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measure of welfare nor the precise location of the responsibility cut is of great im-
portance. When analyzing developments in equality of opportunity over time, where
we place the residual matters quite a bit, while enlarging the effort set further has
few implications. Although the trend may change depending on what we hold indi-
viduals responsible for, for a given responsibility cut, the well-being measures follow
broadly the same trend.
4.4 Robustness Checks
In this section, we test whether our findings are sensitive to using other divergence
measures and fair allocation rules. Our primary interest is not whether the trends
change as we change the method, but rather whether the four well-being measures
follow similar trends regardless of what method we use. First, we try to use the
Generalized Proportional allocation rule rather than the Egalitarian Equivalent al-
location rule. Since the results now will depend on which norm vector we use, we
show the results using the mode/mean circumstance (for categorical and continu-
ous variables, respectively), as well as the worst and best circumstances, as defined
by their bivariate relationship with welfare. Results are shown in Figure A.2 in
Appendix A.4. Although large confidence bands prevent us from nailing down the
trends with precision, particularly, when the worst circumstances are used as the
norm vector, in the other two cases, point estimates suggest that the measures follow
broadly the same trend.
Next we try to use the Magdalou-Nock divergence measures with s = 0 and
s = 2 rather than s = 1. Results are shown in Figure A.3 in Appendix A.4.
Again, we face wide confidence intervals. When s = 0, point estimates suggest that
inequality of opportunity has decreased over the past 15 years with all measures.
Things look a bit different with s = 2, where no trend is visible over the last
10 years with life satisfaction and the multidimensional index while inequality of
opportunity for income decreased. Since s = 2 gives less weight to the bottom
of the distribution, this suggest that the improvements in equality of opportunity
found in our baseline scenario mostly arose since the most opportunity deprived
were given greater chances. At the top of the distribution, the relationship between
opportunities and outcomes remains equally strong.
We also try using different divergence measures; the Fairness Gini and the cor-
relation between opportunity ranks and welfare ranks. The latter comes with a
number of distinct advantages: 1) The measure is constrained to be between 0 and
1 so there is little need to index the numbers to 1992 = 100, 2) the confidence bands
are narrower, 3) it minimizes our reliance on cardinality which is problematic in
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the case of life satisfaction, 4) it assures that we are comparing well-being measures
that follow the same distributions, 5) it is more intuitive to understand, 6) it allows
for zero and negative well-being levels to easily be included in the analysis, 7) it
generalizes a frequently used measure of intergenerational mobility, and as such the
results can be compared with certain intergenerational mobility studies. Results are
displayed in Figure A.4 in Appendix A.4. Both with the Fairness Gini and Spear-
man correlation, result suggest that inequality of opportunity has improved for all
four measures over the past 10-15 years.
5 Conclusion
We have investigated if equality of opportunity estimates depend on what, pre-
cisely, we seek to equalize opportunities for. Based on philosophical literature on
well-being, we constructed four measures of welfare that are candidates for what we
ought to equalize opportunities for. Upon constructing these, we analyzed if the
way welfare is measured matters for 1) characterizing the opportunity-deprived and
2) tracking inequality of opportunity over time. We found that, for the most part,
neither depend greatly on what measure of well-being we use. These results are
robust to most alternative measurement assumptions and changes to the responsi-
bility cut. This is encouraging news for researchers and policymakers interested in
going beyond GDP. Whereas previous research has shown that going beyond GDP
matters greatly for defining the welfare-deprived and for tracking growth in wel-
fare over time, our findings suggest that going beyond income is less important if
the object of interest is to equalize opportunities. Circumstances beyond individual
control influence welfare in a similar fashion regardless of how welfare is measured.
Hence, for matters of distributive justice, alternative measures of GDP seem to have
less importance, and a good picture may be achieved by simply using incomes as a
proxy variable for welfare.
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A.1 Equivalent Income Regression Output
Table A.1: Equivalent Income Regression
Dep var: Life Satisfaction
Coef. Std. err.
Log income 0.161*** (0.058)
Log income * Place of birth: East Germany 0.190*** (0.036)
Log income * Female -0.008 (0.032)
Log income * Age 0.001 (0.001)
Log income * Weekly work hours -0.000 (0.001)
Log income * Self-employed 0.023 (0.037)
Log income * Works in public sector -0.047* (0.025)
Employed 1.192*** (0.091)
Employed * Place of birth: East Germany -0.030 (0.049)
Employed * Female -0.183*** (0.049)
Employed * Age -0.010*** (0.002)
Health 0.090*** (0.035)
Health * Place of birth: East Germany -0.020 (0.017)
Health * Female -0.007 (0.016)
Health * Age 0.002*** (0.001)
Health * Weekly work hours 0.000 (0.000)
Health * Self-employed -0.052* (0.027)
Health * Works in public sector -0.002 (0.016)
Leisure -0.026 (0.018)
Leisure * Place of birth: East Germany -0.014 (0.009)
Leisure * Female 0.006 (0.009)
Leisure * Age 0.001** (0.000)
Leisure * Weekly work hours 0.000* (0.000)
Leisure * Self-employed -0.006 (0.014)
Leisure * Works in public sector -0.009 (0.008)
Weekly work hours -0.000 (0.008)
Self-employed 0.141 (0.426)
Works in public sector 0.530* (0.276)
Observations 170142
r2 0.040
Notes: * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. OLS regression with fixed effects and
individual-level clustered standard errors. Includes year dummies. The interactions
between employment and work hours, private sector work and public sector work are
excluded for reasons of multicollinearity. In about 6% of the cases, the coefficient on
leisure (when taking the interactions with leisure into account) is negative. In these
cases the contribution from leisure is constrained to equal 0.
33
A.2 Decomposition of Equivalent Incomes
The equivalent incomes are calculated from the following equation:
ln(inceqit ) = ln(incit) +
βdim + γdimwit
βinc + γincwit
(dimit − ˜dim) (17)
We want to decompose this into a part that reflects the welfare individuals derive
from their specific preferences, and a part that reflects the welfare individuals receive
independent of their particular preferences. To do so, we define a set of norm
preferences by fixing the preference heterogeneity variables at a given level, w˜, and
computing individuals’ equivalent incomes with these norm preferences:
ln( ˜inc
eq
it ) = ln(incit) +
βdim + γdimw˜
βinc + γincw˜
(dimit − ˜dim) (18)
We choose the mean (mode for categorical variables) of the preference heterogeneity
variables as the norm preferences. ln( ˜inc
eq
it ) does not depend on an individual’s
preferences, and has thus taken the preference heterogeneity out of the original
equivalent incomes. We can now express an individual’s equivalent income as,
ln(inceqit ) = ln( ˜inc
eq
it ) + φit, (19)
where φit is the contribution to equivalent incomes individuals receive from the
match between their particular bundle and their preferences. An example is given
in Figure A.1. We consider three individuals, A, B, and C, and two dimensions
of well-being, income and health. A, B, and C consume the same bundle, which
contains a lot of income but only little health. They have different preferences, with
A putting the largest preference on income relative to health compared to B and
C. It seems fitting that A should derive the most welfare from this income-heavy
bundle, which also is the case when we calculate the three individuals’ equivalent
incomes.
Suppose that A, B, and C have different preferences because of variation in
a circumstance variable, for example their parents’ level of education. If we use
equivalent incomes as the welfare variable that is regressed on effort and circum-
stance variables, which include parental education, then the coefficient on parents’
education will eat up the differences in equivalent incomes. As a result, A, B, and
C’s fair outcomes – which are based on their equivalent incomes after removing the
contributions from circumstances – will be equal. The divergence between the fair
outcomes and the actual outcomes will be large, which means we consider the three
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Figure A.1: Equivalent Income Illustration
ln(inceqB )
ln(inceqC )
ln(inceqA )
xA = xB = xC
uB
uC
uA
h˜ Health (h)
Log income
individuals to have large unjust differences in well-being. In other words, differ-
ences due to preference heterogeneity from circumstances are not considered fair,
and individuals are not held fully responsible for their preferences.
Our decomposition can circumvent this problem. In this example, we choose
individual B’s preferences as the norm preferences. Our decomposition asks what
level of equivalent incomes each individual would have had with B’s preferences. In
this case, all three individuals would have ln( ˜inc
eq
i ) = ln(inc
eq
B ) for i = A,B,C. This
means that φA = inc
eq
A − inceqB > 0 and φC = inceqC − inceqB < 0, implying that A gets
a positive boost from the match between his bundle of goods and his preferences,
while the reverse applies to C.
We want to adapt the regressions such that individuals are held accountable
for their φ-terms. To this end, we can regress ln( ˜inc
eq
it ), instead of ln(inc
eq
it ), on
circumstance and effort variables. Since the φ-terms are not part of these regres-
sions, the circumstance variables can no longer pick up well-being differences due to
preference heterogeneity. When calculating individuals’ fair outcomes based on this
regression, we add back the φ-terms, such that individuals are fully held responsible
for their preferences. We still use the baseline equivalent incomes, ln(inceqit ), for the
divergence measures, but the fair outcomes will be based on a regression where the
φ-terms are fully accounted for.
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A.3 Regression Output
Table A.2: Regressing Welfare on Circumstances and Effort
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A.4 Robustness Checks
Figure A.2: Changing the Allocation Rule: Generalized Proportionality Principle
(a) Mode/mean norm vector
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(b) Worst norm vector
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
In
eq
ua
lit
y 
of
 o
pp
. (
19
92
=1
00
)
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Log Income Life Satisfaction
Multidim. Index Log Equivalent Incomes
(c) Best norm vector
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1992-2016 using
the Generalized Proportionality principle instead of the Egalitarian Equivalence principle. In all
cases we use the Magdalou-Nock Divergence measure with s = 1. In panel (b) the confidence
interval of the equivalent income measure is so wide that it is excluded.
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Figure A.3: Changing the Parameter of the Magdalou-Nock Divergence Measure
(a) Magdalou-Nock, s = 0
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(b) Magdalou-Nock, s = 2
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1992-2016 using
different specifications of the Magdalou-Nock class, combined with the Egalitarian Equivalent
principle.
Figure A.4: Changing the Divergence Measure
(a) Fairness Gini
80
10
0
12
0
14
0
16
0
In
eq
ua
lit
y 
of
 o
pp
. (
19
92
=1
00
)
1995 2000 2005 2010 2015
Log Income Life Satisfaction
Multidim. Index Log Equivalent Incomes
(b) Spearman Correlation
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Notes: Development in inequality of opportunity in each well-being variable from 1992-2016 using
different divergence measures.
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